Why our NationalIntelligenceEstimates may notbe as reliable asmany think.
Can We Still Trust National Intelligence Estimates?By Cliff Montgomery – Jan. 2nd, 2007How important are National Intelligence Estimates, those “white papers” produced by the intelligence community about a certain country or region of the world? Can they even be trusted? After all, the infamous 2002 Iraq National Intelligence Estimate is the report which stated that Iraq still held viable Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and was further still producing such items–charges which this reporter later proved to be “group think” at best, and outright lying at worst.Below we quote from a November 2006 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the subject. Since the CRS is widely known for the impartiality of its reports, its statements demand a hearing.“National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to many Members of Congress. They represent the most formal assessment of a given issue by the U.S. Intelligence Community and address issues of major national security importance which may require congressional action.”The intelligence process and its assessment are, however, not an exact science and, on occasion, NIEs have proved unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This was demonstrated in the NIE produced in 2002 on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, parts of which were significantly inaccurate.”In the past, Congress was not a principal consumer of NIEs but now appears increasingly interested in obtaining NIEs on key security issues despite–or perhaps because of–the experience with the 2002 Iraq NIE. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act…specifically requests a comprehensive NIE on Iran.”Some observers assert, however, that public discussion on specific NIEs may not adequately reflect the process by which they are prepared, or their inherent limitations.”NIEs represent the highest and most formal level of strategic analysis by the U.S. Intelligence Community. They are by definition forward-looking…NIEs focus on foreign developments; they are not net assessments that directly compare U.S. and foreign capabilities and plans.”The responsibility for producing NIEs rests on the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an entity within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The NIC consists of senior analysts from the Intelligence Community and substantive experts from the public and private sector. Draft estimates are coordinated by senior officials of all intelligence agencies in a process that can be quite lengthy.”In drafting NIEs, analysts marshal evidence from all sources available to the Intelligence Community–human intelligence, signals intelligence, overhead surveillance, and others including the exploitation of open sources (foreign media and, increasingly, websites). The lengthy drafting and coordination process includes participation by agency analysts and occasionally outside experts with varying perspectives.”At a minimum, NIEs require that differences among analysts be confronted and described. This is an important contribution as policymakers need to know what is known by the Intelligence Community and what remains unknown and what conclusions drawn by the government’s most experienced analysts.”U.S. policymaking, however, occasionally is based on directives by Presidents or senior officials that have not been coordinated throughout the executive branch or with Congress. Some policy makers assume that their own long experience and extensive personal contacts gives them better insights than even the most senior intelligence officials. In considering major new initiatives, there can be an obsessive concern with the potential for leaks that limits discussion to a very small circle of advisers, and excludes much of the Intelligence Community which is independent of political appointees.”And there may also be a looming problem with the current batch of NIEs, which is revealed in a footnote to the report. It is an issue often not discussed in the corporate press:”Though composed of analysts from various government agencies and the public and private sector, the NIC has always depended heavily on CIA analysts for research and drafting NIEs. The NIC originally reported to the DCI [CIA chief] in his role as head of the Intelligence Community, but the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004…transferred the NIC to the newly created Office of the DNI [Director of National Intelligence]. [Hence] many, if not most, current [NIE analysts] are not CIA career analysts and some observers believe that CIA’s preeminent analytical role has diminished.Nevertheless, CIA has the broadest analytical coverage of any agency and the largest number of analysts and is likely to be heavily involved in the preparation of future NIEs.”This footnote produces an obvious question: what do we make of the NIEs, when the best informed analysts are apparently no longer the ones primarily shaping these estimates which define national policy, and which may even plunge us into another war?
