Has State Dept. Learned Mistakes Of Iraq?

The department finally seems to understand that the democratic movements of a nation must come from the people themselves. Has State Dept. Learned Mistakes Of Iraq?By Cliff Montgomery – Feb. 11th, 2008Today is publishing the entire executive summary of a State Department report published in October 2007. Counterinsurgency For U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work In Progress, seems to reveal an intellectual sea change in at least some levels of the Bush Administration.The tone and relative thoughtfulness of this study–particularly the segments discussing the need for any nation’s democratic movements to come from the people themselves if they are to have any hope of success–is noteworthy.We quote the summary below:“The relative stability of the bipolar Cold War era has given way to a more volatile international environment in which adversaries employ unconventional, and often violent, tactics including terrorism, insurgency, propaganda, subversion, sabotage, and criminal money-making activities.”This Interim Guide focuses specifically on insurgency and the strategies and tactics to combat it, collectively known as counterinsurgency (COIN).”Information, including intelligence; economic development, incentives, and sanctions; security and public services; and social and political resolution are all necessary components of COIN, and none is sufficient in isolation from the others; moreover, each of these four spheres depends on the others.”This document is intended to provide a broad understanding of the characteristics of COIN, and to serve as a basis for interagency discussion of policy, programs, and the development of national capabilities relevant to COIN.”Insurgency is a protracted political-military campaign conducted by an organized movement seeking to subvert or displace the government and completely or partially control the resources and/or population of a country through the use of force and alternative political organizations.”Insurgents exploit societal trends, grievances, and needs; insurgency is ‘armed politics,’ and while military action may be an important component of COIN, political resolution is indispensable to success.”Conflict dynamics that contribute to insurgencies include societal incentives for violence; state incapacity to contain or effectively respond to violence; and regional or broader international conditions that inspire, or fail to discourage, violence.”Effective COIN requires deep and detailed context- and culture-specific understanding of local and regional conditions, and ultimately must enable the affected government to gain the support of its population, rendering ineffective the insurgents and their tactics.”In the U.S. Government, when the President directs a national response to a current or emerging conflict, the Secretary of State manages the formal interagency assessment and planning process that will govern the USG response.”Where insurgency, nascent or active, does not rise to the level of Presidential determination, interagency efforts, starting with the U.S. mission to the affected nation, may be able, in concerted action with the host nation and other partners, to help prevent or curtail the development of a serious challenge by insurgent actors to the affected government.”An integrated – and ideally, a whole-of-government – planning effort based on a common assessment of the environment and understanding of the problem is the most effective approach to buttressing or helping to build effective  government institutions in COIN.”Planning will integrate civilian and military capabilities, and synchronize and sequence the activities of contributors, to help the threatened government achieve control through indigenous government institutions.”An effective information campaign is indispensable to the validation and reinforcement of COIN activities.“The public face and main effort of every COIN operation must be indigenous; only the national government can address in a sustainable way the root causes an insurgency, establish its legitimacy with its populations, and remove or reintegrate the insurgents.”Developing indigenous capabilities to accomplish these tasks is central to COIN, and international support is essential to the success of the effort; in fact, supporting the development of these capabilities must be the main effort of COIN.”Enlisting and enabling the support and assistance of regional and other  interested partners should be a key component of any COIN plan. [Italics added.]“U.S government organizations with roles or capabilities essential to COIN include the Intelligence Community; the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, land Security, Agriculture, Transportation, Commerce, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.”Other agencies, such as the  Departments of Education and Health and Human Services, may have relevant capabilities.”The National Security Council may play a leading, coordinating, or enabling role in COIN strategy development and execution.”The Chief of Mission, supported by the Combatant Commander, coordinates with the affected nation the implementation of U.S. government support to COIN. The representatives of each department and agency on the Country Team support with their particular programs and operations the overall COIN strategy.”The contributions of other national and international organizations, as well as non-governmental and private sector actors, are critical to effective COIN. Every functional contribution that strengthens or promotes accountable and effective indigenous governance responsive to the needs of its people is important; COIN is the sum of these efforts.”Like what you’re reading so far? Then why not order a full year (52 issues) of thee-newsletter for only $15? A major article covering an story not being told in the Corporate Press will be delivered to your email every Monday morning for a full year, for less than 30 cents an issue. Order Now!