By Cliff Montgomery – Feb. 23rd, 2014
Current federal data on U.S. intelligence contractors are unreliable, stated a recently-released study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
This deficit of solid information undermines such essential matters as contractor oversight, workforce management and accurate assessments of contractor costs, continued GAO.
“GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory [of intelligence contractors] that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC [intelligence community] elements as a whole,” stated the January GAO report.
The lackluster array of information “does not provide insight into the functions performed by contractors, in particular those that could inappropriately influence the government’s control over its decisions,” added the study.
No doubt the revelations from Edward Snowden – a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor – on the NSA’s surveillance of U.S. citizens was a major reason for this report.
But we at The American Spark take away one essential truth from the GAO study: The U.S. intelligence community lacks even basic reliable data about its own wheelings and dealings, even as it consistently demands greater powers to spy on all of us.
So why should Americans trust the intelligence community with an essentially unchecked power to watch and judge all of us, when it can’t even properly police itself? We think it’s a question that deserves a serious answer.
Below, The American Spark quotes sections from the GAO study’s ‘Highlights’:
Why GAO Did This Study
“The IC [Intelligence Community] uses core contract personnel to augment its workforce. These contractors typically work alongside government personnel and perform staff-like work.
“Some core contract personnel require enhanced oversight because they perform services that could inappropriately influence the government’s decision making.
“This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in September 2013. GAO was asked to examine the eight civilian IC elements’ use of contractors.
“This report examines: (1) the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements use core contract personnel, (2) the functions performed by these personnel and the reasons for their use, and (3) whether the elements developed policies and strategically planned for their use.
What GAO Found
“Limitations in the Intelligence Community’s (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, land Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury—use these personnel.
“The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel.
“However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole.
“For example, changes to the definition of ‘core contract personnel’ and ‘data shortcomings’ limit the comparability of the information over time.
“In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the 287 records GAO reviewed.
“Further, IC CHCO did not fully disclose the effects of such limitations when reporting contract personnel and cost information to Congress, which limits its transparency and usefulness.” […]
“Civilian IC elements reported in the inventory a number of reasons for using core contract personnel, such as the need for unique expertise, but GAO found that 40 percent of the contract records reviewed did not contain evidence to support the reasons reported.
“Collectively, CIA, ODNI, and the departments responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six civilian IC elements have made limited progress in developing those policies, and the civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use.
“Only the Departments of land Security and State have issued policies that generally address all of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s requirements related to contracting for services that could affect the government’s decision-making authority.” […]
“Further, the elements’ ability to use the core contract personnel inventory as a strategic planning tool is hindered because the inventory does not provide insight into the functions performed by contractors, in particular those that could inappropriately influence the government’s control over its decisions.
“Without guidance, strategies, and tools related to these types of functions, the eight civilian IC elements may not be well-positioned to identify and manage related risks.”
What GAO Recommends
“GAO is recommending that IC CHCO take several actions to improve the inventory data’s reliability and transparency and revise strategic workforce planning guidance, and develop ways to identify contracts for services that could affect the government’s decision-making authority.
“IC CHCO generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations.”
