Political and security problems in Iraq are primarily driven by Shia and Sunni insecurities, not by Al-Qaeda, says August NIE.National Intelligence Estimate Reveals Bush Lying On IraqBy Cliff Montgomery – Sept. 10th, 2007 today provides several quotes from an August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq entitled, Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive. It is an updated assessment of the January 2007 NIE on Iraq entitled, Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead.The studies are prepared at the direction of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and provide the Intelligence Community’s analysis of “the critical factors…that are driving Iraq’s security and political trajectory.”And unlike Bush Administration generals who merely claim to have a special understanding of the social and political problems plaguing Iraq, the DNI is speaking within its field of expertise.”National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests,” the DNI declares.Its conclusions on the current Iraq situation are often jarringly different than those of George W. Bush. We quote below:“Driven largely by the accelerating pace of tribal engagement and the increasing tempo of Coalition operations…Regional variations in security and political circumstances are great and becoming increasingly more distinct–for example, intra-Shia violence in southern Iraq is very different from patterns of violence elsewhere.”The unfolding pace and scope of security and political realities in Iraq, combined with our necessarily limited focus of analysis, contain risks: our uncertainties are greater, and our future projections subject to greater chances of error.”These issues, combined with the challenges of acquiring accurate data on trends in violence and continued gaps in our information about levels of violence and political trends in areas of Iraq without a substantial Coalition presence and where Intelligence Community collectors have difficulty operating, heighten our caution.”Nonetheless, we stand by these judgments as our best collective assessment of security and political conditions in Iraq today and as likely to unfold during the next six to12 months.“There have been measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq’s security situation since our last National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in January 2007.“The steep escalation of rates of violence has been checked for now, and overall attack levels across Iraq have fallen during seven of the last nine weeks. Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents, have reduced al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s (AQI) capabilities, restricted its freedom of movement, and denied it grassroots support in some areas.“However, the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high; Iraq’s sectarian groups remain un-reconciled; AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks; and to date, Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern effectively.”There have been modest improvements in economic output, budget execution, and government finances but fundamental structural problems continue to prevent sustained progress in economic growth and living conditions.”We assess, to the extent that Coalition forces continue to conduct robust counterinsurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), that Iraq’s security will continue to improve modestly during the next six to 12 months but that levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high and the Iraqi Government will continue to struggle to achieve national-level political reconciliation and improved governance.“Broadly accepted political compromises required for sustained security, long-term political progress, and economic development are unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security developments.“Political and security trajectories in Iraq continue to be driven primarily by Shia insecurity about retaining political dominance, widespread Sunni unwillingness to accept a diminished political status, factional rivalries within the sectarian communities resulting in armed conflict, and the actions of extremists such as AQI and elements of the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia that try to fuel sectarian violence.
- Intra-Shia conflict involving factions competing for power and resources probably will intensify as Iraqis assume control of provincial security. In Basrah, violence has escalated with the drawdown of Coalition forces there. Local militias show few signs of reducing their competition for control of valuable oil resources and territory.
- The Sunni Arab community remains politically fragmented, and we see no prospective leaders that might engage in meaningful dialogue and deliver on national agreements.
- Kurdish leaders remain focused on protecting the autonomy of the Kurdish region and reluctant to compromise on key issues.
- Sunni Arab resistance to AQI has expanded in the last six to nine months but has not yet translated into broad Sunni Arab support for the Iraqi Government or widespread willingness to work with the Shia.
“The IC assesses that the Iraqi Government will become more precarious over the next six to 12 months because of criticism by other members of the major Shia coalition (the Unified Iraqi Alliance, UIA), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish parties.”Like what you’re reading so far? Then why not order a full year (52 issues) ofe-newsletter for only $15? A major article covering an story not being told in the Corporate Press will be delivered to your email every Monday morning for a full year, for less than 30 cents an issue. Order Now!
