By Cliff Montgomery – Apr. 25th, 2011
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in February issued a little-known–yet absolutely fascinating–report on the true state of America’s Afghan War.
“No allied government provides credible reporting on the progress of the war, and the Afghan government provides little detail of any kind,” states the study, adding that “the US, its allies, and ISAF [International Security Assistance Force, the NATO-led troop mission in Afghanistan] may currently be repeating the same kind of overall messaging as the ‘follies’ presented in Vietnam.”
The American Spark offers essential quotes from the report’s overview:
“The US is scarcely alone in failing to provide adequate reporting on the Afghan conflict. No allied government provides credible reporting on the progress of the war, and the Afghan government provides little detail of any kind. The UN, which has major responsibilities for aid, has failed to provide a meaningful overview of how aid requirements are generated, how aid efforts are managed and coordinated, of how funds are used, of the quality of fiscal controls and auditing, and of the effectiveness and impact of aid.
“There are, however, some useful unclassified metrics in spite of the tendency to ‘spin’ and ‘message control.’
“Moreover, some reflect real progress since the adoption of the new strategy for the war, which indicates that a more frank, meaningful, and open reporting system would do a far more convincing job of winning support for the conflict – as well as be a way of obtaining the kind of feedback and informed criticism that could help meet the many problems and challenges that still shape the course of the fighting. […]
“Even an overview of the strengths and weakness of unclassified metrics does, however, provide considerable insight into both what is know about the war, and the many areas where meaningful reporting is lacking and the reporting available is deceptive and misleading.
“The US, its allies, and ISAF may currently be repeating the same kind of overall messaging as the ‘follies’ presented in Vietnam, but there are enough areas where facts still become public to put much of the war into perspective.
The Failures That Shaped Today’s War
“This first report in this series highlights some of the metrics that reflect a consistent failure to properly resource the Afghan campaign, and to react to the growth of the Taliban, the Al Qa’ida sanctuary in Pakistan, and the failures of the Afghan government [that] turned near victory into near defeat.
“These failures were driven in part by the lack of unity and realism in ISAF, an ineffective UN effort, a US focus on the Iraq War, and by a US force posture whose deployable land forces can only fight one major regional contingency at a time.
“They also, however, were driven by political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and insurgent gains from 2002-2009, to ignore the problems caused by weak and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate the risks posed by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and to ‘spin’ the value of tactical ISAF victories while ignoring the steady growth of Taliban influence and control.
“The failures involved went much further than unclassified metrics can portray – although some trends are clear and others are illustrated in the future reports in this series.
“These failures included:
- Mirror imaging of US and European values in trying to create a political system, and central government structure that did not allow for a lack of capacity, effective local and regional government, and a justice system based on Afghan values and practices.
- Major intelligence failures.
- Failure to create effective ISAF forces and PRT structures, and coordinate civil-military efforts. [PRT, or Provincial Reconstruction Team, is the U.S.-led group working to rebuild Afghanistan.]
- Failure to create effective Afghan forces.
- A failure to focus on creating a functional justice system.
- Failure to create effective aid and development programs.
- Failure to focus on Transition and any form of ‘End State.’
“Virtually every expert on the Afghan War could add new points to this list. It is also obvious from many of these points that the metrics shown in this report can only hint at a few key trends and problems. In far too many cases, there are no metrics and no reliable detailed histories – although the kind of metrics and analysis that should have existed are easy to derive from the summary of each problem.
“At the same time, it is critical to stress that the other parts of this report show that major progress is being made in addressing many of the issues involved, and metrics are only part of that story.
“For all of the spin and omissions that still surround reporting on the war, major progress has occurred over the last two years, and additional major efforts to correct these problems are underway.
“They will be analyzed in the future parts of this report.”
