How may we be sure that materials from Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal won’t fall into the wrong hands? Who’s In Control Of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal?By Cliff Montgomery – Mar. 18th, 2008 poses a simple question about Pakistan’s current leader: If President Pervez Musharraf cannot–or will not–hunt down al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, how may we be sure that materials from his country’s nuclear arsenal won’t fall into their hands?That was the essential question investigated by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in a telling report released on January 14th, 2008.Below we offer numerous quotes from the study:“Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles. Pakistan reportedly stores its warheads unassembled with the fissile core separate from non-nuclear explosives, and these are stored separately from their delivery vehicles. […]”Command and control structures have been dramatically overhauled since September 11, 2001 and export controls and personnel security programs have been put in place since the 2004 revelations about Pakistan’s top nuclear scientists, A.Q. Khan’s international proliferation network.”Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials and improve its nuclear security. A number of important initiatives such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved the security situation in recent years.”For example, the government announced in June 2007 that it is ‘implementing a National Security Action Plan with the [IAEA’s] assistance.’ That same month, Pakistan also joined the U.S. — and Russian-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.”[But] current instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls.”While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, it is uncertain what impact continued instability in the country will have on these safeguards. […]Proliferation Threat“Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan. Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used clandestine procurement networks to develop its nuclear weapons program. Former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan subsequently used a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment.”Al-Qaeda has also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, the United States ‘received fragmentary information from an intelligence service’ that in 1998 Osama bin Laden had ‘sent emissaries to establish contact’ with the network.”Other Pakistani sources could also provide nuclear material to terrorist organizations. According to a 2005 report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, al-Qaeda ‘had established contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of nuclear devices that would require hard-to-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion.'”Tenet explains that these scientists were affiliated with a different organization than the Khan network.”The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear, although most official reports indicate that, at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied that the network had been dismantled when he asserted in a January 11, 2007 statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that ‘Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A.Q. Khan network.'”However, when asked about the network’s current status during a July 25, 2007 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns replied that:
- I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it’s my understanding based on our conversations with the Pakistanis that the network has been fundamentally dismantled. But to say that there are no elements in Pakistan, I’m not sure I could say that.
“Similarly, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies found in a May 2007 report that ‘at least some of Khan’s associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could…resume their black-market business.'”Asked about Pakistan’s cooperation in investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the United States has not had ‘personal, consistent access’ to Khan, but added that he did not ‘have all the details of everything we’ve done.'”Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not yet been able to interview Khan directly, according to an agency official. However, Islamabad has responded to written questions from the IAEA and has been cooperative in its investigation of Iran’s nuclear program. […]”Pakistani officials participating in an April 2007 Partnership for Global Security workshop argued that Islamabad has improved the reliability of its nuclear personnel by, for example, making its security clearance procedures more stringent. However, the officials also acknowledged that Islamabad still needs to do more to control its nuclear expertise.”Like what you’re reading so far? Then why not order a full year (52 issues) of thee-newsletter for only $15? A major article covering an story not being told in the Corporate Press will be delivered to your email every Monday morning for a full year, for less than 30 cents an issue. Order Now!
