The Osprey series of military aircraft perform essential activities on the modern battlefield. The Osprey aircraft combine the vertical takeoff and landing capabilities of a military helicopter, with the greater range and speed found in fixed-wing aircraft.
The problem? For years, federal agencies have quietly ignored or have failed to properly address massive safety flaws in the Osprey series. This failure has translated into unnecessary death and injury for U.S. troops.
In 2023 and 2024 alone, “Rates of serious accidents [for the Osprey series] were between 36 percent and 88 percent higher than [the Marines and Air Force’s] average rate for the prior 8 fiscal years,” according to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study publicly released today.
Yet, GAO has found continued “concerns with the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ability to collect and share the information needed to identify and mitigate aviation safety risks,” states the report.
Below, the American Spark quotes the introductory “Highlights” page of the GAO study, which offers an assessment of the department’s findings on this matter:
What GAO Found
“The Marine Corps and Air Force had higher rates of the most serious accidents in the last 2 fiscal years (2023 and 2024) with its Osprey aircraft compared with the average serious accident rate for the previous 8 years, based on available Department of Defense (DOD) data.
“In fiscal years 2023 and 2024 [alone], 18 serious, non-combat accidents occurred involving death; permanent disability; extensive hospitalization; property damage of $600,000 or more; or a destroyed aircraft.
“Rates of serious accidents were between 36 percent and 88 percent higher than each service’s average [accident] rate for the prior 8 fiscal years.
“Rates of serious accidents with the Osprey aircraft generally exceeded those of the Departments of the Navy and Air Force fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft fleets for fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2024.
“Most reported causes for serious accidents related to materiel failure of airframe or engine components and human error during aircraft operations or maintenance, according to GAO’s analysis of safety data.
“Osprey program stakeholders have not fully identified, analyzed, or responded with procedural or materiel mitigations to all safety risks. For example, program stakeholders, which include the Osprey Joint Program Office and military services that operate the aircraft, had closed 45 risk assessments at the time of our review, but had not fully responded to 34 known system-related risks related to the potential failure of airframe and engine components.
“Stakeholders also had not identified actions to respond to non-system safety risks associated with aircraft maintenance and operations, such as mis-matches in maintenance skill levels and limited training time to build aircrew experience. Without refining the joint program’s process for identifying, analyzing, and responding to Osprey safety risks to incorporate and prioritize system and non-system safety risks, program stakeholders cannot adequately mitigate risks that can contribute to death, injury, or loss of mission capability and resources.
“Program stakeholders described factors that affected their ability to fully resolve Osprey safety risks, including challenges with how program stakeholders developed priorities and plans for addressing safety issues. These stakeholders identified costly, long-term engineering solutions and safety improvements that were required across a joint program with varied fleet sizes, which created longer risk mitigation timelines.
“GAO found that the median age for 28 unresolved serious and medium system risks was about 9 years, and over half (17 of 28) had been unresolved for between 6 and 14 years.
“New initiatives established in 2024 are intended to address several of these factors, but these efforts did not comprehensively address non-system safety risks or include information for each service’s Osprey variant. Without determining an oversight structure with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for resolving known safety risks or conducting periodic reviews of efforts to resolve them, DOD cannot have reasonable assurance that program stakeholders will fully resolve the interrelated system and non-system safety risks affecting the Osprey.
“GAO found that the Osprey program stakeholders have not routinely shared information in three areas to promote the safe operation of the aircraft. [They are: 1.) Hazard and accident reporting, 2.) Aircraft knowledge and emergency procedures, and 3.) Maintenance data for common aircraft components and parts.]
Hazard and accident reporting
“Program stakeholders have not proactively shared hazard and accident reporting information with Osprey units and unit safety personnel in the other services that operate the aircraft.Determining a process to proactively share relevant safety information with these personnel would provide greater assurance that Osprey units have the information needed to update their safety procedures.
Aircraft knowledge and emergency procedures
Program stakeholders did not convene a multi-service conference or other forum to share Osprey aircraft knowledge and emergency procedures for 5 years (from 2020 to 2025). Service-specific changes to operational practices included safety related information, but these changes were not readily shared among the services, according to unit personnel with whom GAO spoke. The military services that operate the aircraft held a conference in May 2025, but they had not formalized plans to continue to do so. Without such a routine method, Osprey units have missed out on opportunities to share information that would enhance the safe operations of the aircraft.
Maintenance data for common aircraft components and parts
“Program stakeholders have taken steps to address maintenance data integrity issues for the hundreds of common Osprey aircraft components and parts that are share across the services, but they have yet to confirm that all implementation steps have been completed. Without conducting a comprehensive review of Osprey maintenance guidance and inspection procedures, program stakeholders do not have assurance that efforts to improve maintenance information sharing have resolved data integrity issues, including [the data needs] for critical life-limited Osprey components, which has hindered their ability to ensure the safe operation of the aircraft.”
